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Abstract
What drives the observed tendency of new FDI, other things equal, to be attracted
to locations where many other foreign investors are located? One explanation in the
literature on FDI location is that expected benefits from agglomeration externalities
make firms want to locate in agglomerated regions. Alternatively, potential investors
get information about conditions in a host from firms in their own business network
that already have experience from that country. We study how Norwegian FDI location
choice depends on previous Norwegian presence, using information about institutional
quality to separate the impact of information sharing from agglomeration externalities.
The impact of previous Norwegian investors is larger in countries with low institutional
quality. We interpret this as consistent with the presence of information sharing among
Norwegian investors.
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1 Introduction
As foreign direct investment (FDI) have increased immensely over the last decades, a large
body of theoretical and empirical literature has emerged seeking to explain the magnitude
and location of FDI.1 Several studies find that even after controlling for the general at-
tractiveness of a host region, new FDI seems to be attracted to regions where other foreign
investors are already present. This evidence of a clustering pattern in FDI is typically ex-
plained by agglomeration externalities.2 The number of FDI firms already active in a country
when a new firm considers where to locate its FDI is used as a proxy for the strength of
agglomeration externalities.3 Other things equal, the potential for such benefits will make a
location with many previous foreign investors (i.e. an agglomerated region) preferred over a
less agglomerated one.
In the literature, two alternative and/or complementary explanations have been dis-
cussed. First, clustering could be a result of imitation; the presence of foreign investors in
a host reduces uncertainty about expected profits by providing a signal of profit opportun-
ities (Arau´jo, 2009; Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). Second, firms with FDI experience in
a host country may share information that reduces the costs of locating FDI in the same
host for other investors in the same business network (Blonigen, Ellis and Fausten, 2005).4
Depending on the explanation proposed, the number of foreign firms already present in a
host country has been used in the literature to proxy the potential for agglomeration ex-
1See Blonigen (2005) and references therein for an overview of the empirical literature on FDI determin-
ants.
2Studies concluding that agglomeration externalities are important for the location of FDI are e.g. Head,
Ries and Swenson (1995); Head and Mayer (2004); Gross, Raff and Ryan (2005); Devereux, Griffith and
Simpson (2007); Wheeler and Mody (1992); Devereux and Griffith (1998); Barrell and Pain (1999); Brau-
nerhjelm and Svensson (1996); Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996); Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004); Du,
Lu and Tao (2008); Hogenbirk and Narula (2004).
3Marshall (1920) identified three sources of agglomeration externalities in spatially concentrated indus-
tries: access to a pool of workers with specialized skills, thicker markets for intermediate inputs, and tech-
nological spillovers between firms.
4Note that the imitation explanation does not require any actual knowledge about the host to be shared
between investors, while this is central to the information sharing explanation.
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ternalities, the size of the business network that investing firms get information from, or the
strength of the signal of profit opportunities.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on FDI location decisions by investigating
the role of information sharing among Norwegian investors as a determinant of Norwegian
FDI location. Although we are not able to fully separate the agglomeration, imitation and
information sharing explanations for the observed clustering patterns in FDI, we provide
explicit arguments for how we can interpret our results as consistent with information sharing
rather than the other two explanations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
to consider all three potential explanations for clustering in FDI location choice. Blonigen
et al. (2005) is the first empirical study attempting to distinguish between agglomeration
externalities and networking effects in an analysis of FDI location choice. They study the FDI
decisions of Japanese firms, and use information about formal Japanese business networks;
the keiretsu system.5 While several studies of Japanese FDI use information about vertical
keiretsus in their study of FDI location (e.g.Head et al. (1995); Head and Mayer (2004);
Gross et al. (2005)), Blonigen et al. (2005) use the distinction between vertical and horizontal
keiretsu membership to distinguish between the effect on location choice from agglomeration
externalities and information sharing, respectively.
Firms operating abroad need to overcome additional cost (Markusen, 1995) due to e.g.
language barriers, the need to learn and adapt to local rules and regulations (both official
and unofficial), and being outside local business and government networks. As informal
barriers due to social, cultural and institutional differences are found to have significant
negative effects on international transactions (Trefler, 1995; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001),
the importance of business and social or ethnic networks in overcoming these barriers is
5In the Japanese keiretsu system, vertical keiretsus are often groups of suppliers clustered around large
downstream manufacturing firms, while horizontal keiretsus are groups of firms in often unrelated industries
which are grouped around a large bank or trading company.
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increasingly recognized.6 Foreign firms already located in a host country will have acquired
experience about about how to operate efficiently by for example gaining knowledge about
where the best locations within a country are, and about how to best deal with government
agencies and local firms. For a firm looking to invest in a host, access to information and
knowledge from firms with more experience will be valuable by reducing the risk and costs
involved in the investment. Due to better connections with firms from their home country,
firms are more likely to get access to information from experienced investors from home.
Further, information from same origin investors could prove particularly valuable as these
companies will probably have a more coherent perception of the challenges, problems and
opportunities at the foreign location.7 Consistent with this argument, Crozet et al. (2004)
and Du et al. (2008) find that the tendency for foreign investors to cluster within a host
country is strongest for investors from the same source country.
While the nature of the Japanese keiretsu system provides information about formal busi-
ness networks in the study by Blonigen et al. (2005), we cannot observe any formal networks
between Norwegian firms in our data. The size of the Norwegian business community is,
however, relatively small, we therefore find it likely that information is shared between firms
within the same industry or between firms located close to each other in Norway. Thus, the
number of Norwegian investors present in a host country could be used as a proxy for the net-
work through which investment-relevant information is shared. However, as argued above,
this could also capture the potential for agglomeration externalities. Our main identifying
6For example, Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Coughlin and Wall (2011) find that ethnic networks
between migrants and their home country facilitate international trade between these countries. Rauch
(2001) refers to how business networks through former employees of the same company (IBM in Singapore)
was an important location determinant for Singapore as a destination for FDI. Bandelj (2002) discusses
similar issues with reference to Eastern Europe.
7Various Norwegian agencies recognize the importance of assisting the creation of networks in order to
share FDI information and experience. One example is the government sponsored organization ‘Innovasjon
Norge’ who offers a broad network through Norwegian embassies aimed at assisting Norwegian firms who
invest abroad.(http://www.innovasjonnorge.no). Another example is the appointment by the Norwegian
business organization of an experienced former CEO to assist Norwegian firms with establishing affiliates in
Uganda (Source:e24, a Norwegian internet business newspaper 13.10.2009).
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assumption is that the costs of acquiring FDI-relevant information are larger in countries
with extensive bureaucracy, less transparent government, more corruption and less political
stability, and hence the value of information about a host country (before setting up oper-
ations) is higher when the institutional environment in the potential host country is weak.
At the same time, we believe that the expected benefit from pure agglomeration extern-
alities such as thick labour and input markets should be less sensitive to the institutional
environment in the host country. Thus, if the presence of Norwegian investors in a host is
more important for the location of new FDI by Norwegian firms in host countries with low
institutional quality, we interpret this as consistent with information sharing playing a role
in the location of FDI.8
In order to demonstrate that such an effect is not merely the result of new investors
imitating previous investors because the presence of previous FDI acts as a signal of profit
opportunities in the host, we compare the role of previous investors from two relatively
similar countries on the location decisions of Norwegian FDI. Since there is little in the
imitation argument that imply that the presence of same-origin firms provide a better signal
of profit opportunities in a host than the presence of investors from other countries, the
imitation argument should imply that previous Norwegian and previous Swedish FDI have
rougly similar effects on the probability of location for new Norwegian FDI. Since potential
information sharing through networks of firms is more likely between firms from the same
country, this type of clustering force should imply that previous Norwegian investors play a
more important role for Norwegian FDI location that the presence of Swedish investors in a
host.
8Harding and Javorcik (2011) argue similarly that information asymmetries between host countries and
potential foreign investors are larger for developing countries where information about business conditions is
less readily available and bureaucratic procedures are more burdensome. They find that Investment Promo-
tion Agencies have a positive impact on FDI from the US to the developing world but not to industrialized
countries.
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We apply conditional logit estimation to the location choice for 2645 new FDI projects
from Norway during the years 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003-2005. These projects are located
in 93 different countries. We find evidence that the presence in a host country of other
Norwegian investors operating within the same sector in Norway increases the likelihood
that new Norwegian investors locate their FDI in the same host country. Consistent with
our hypothesis of information sharing playing a role in the location choice of new investors,
the effect of previous Norwegian investors is larger in countries where the institutional quality
is perceived as low, while the presence of Swedish firms in the host is of little importance in
explaining the location choice of Norwegian investors. These results are robust to a number
of robustness tests.
Section 2 describes our data and provides an overview of Norwegian foreign direct in-
vestment in the period from 1990 to 2005. In section 3 we give an outline of our empirical
methodology, while section ?? presents our data and sample of Norwegian investments to-
gether with the definition of our control variables. Section 4 presents our conditional logit
estimates, robustness checks are presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Data
We use data from 1990-2005 from the register of outgoing FDI administered by Statist-
ics Norway. The data record for each year the identity, location and sector of Norwegian
firms that have ownership in firms located abroad. It provides an identity number for the
affiliate abroad, the country where this affiliate is located and the ownership share of the
Norwegian firm. The register contains some accounting data for the affiliate abroad, and
some information about transactions between the affiliate and the Norwegian shareholder.
The data is intended to provide a complete record of Norwegian firms’ ownership interests
abroad. Unfortunately, the data cannot distinguish between affiliates established by green-
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field investment and acquisitions. Throughout the paper we restrict our analysis to foreign
affiliates where the Norwegian owner holds at least a 20% ownership share.9
Figure 1: Value of Norwegian FDI 1990-2005, by host region
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Note: Total equity capital in affiliates abroad are multiplied by the ownerships shares of the
Norwegian owners to arrive at the values of FDI.
Norwegian FDI has increased markedly during the period from 1990 to 2005. We measure
the value of foreign assets held by Norwegian firms through FDI by multiplying total equity
capital of affiliates with ownership shares of Norwegian owners. The value of assets held by
Norwegian firms abroad was about 50 billion NOK in 1990. By 1999 the value was almost
300 billion and by 2005 it was around 620 billion.10 Figure 1 shows the development in the
value of Norwegian FDI in different regions from 1990 to 2005. The bulk of investments
took place in Europe and northern America. Sweden is throughout the period the single
most important host country for Norwegian firms investing abroad. The groups of countries
receiving the largest increase in Norwegian FDI during this period are the fuel exporting
9If we use a 10% cut-off this will only add about 100 new investments to our analysis.
10Due to the lack of an appropriate deflator, we report nominal values.
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countries, the transition countries of Eastern Europe and countries in Asia (notably China).
For the transition countries there has been a steady increase in the value of investments since
they opened up to foreign interest in the early and mid 1990’s.
Table 1: Mean and median values of Norwegian FDI
1990 1995 2000 2005
Host region Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med.
Europe 20,9 0,5 56,2 1,2 92,4 1,9 124,4 2,2
Sweden 14,0 0,2 39,6 0,9 85,6 0,8 93,1 2,7
North America 19,1 0,2 43,0 2,2 90,2 3,4 258,9 5,5
Asia and Oceania 1,6 0,4 12,3 1,3 59,9 2,3 140,4 2,8
Fuel exporting countries 8,4 0,4 39,1 1,7 131,0 3,2 357,2 2,8
Transition countries 0,3 0,2 7,8 0,3 18,5 0,6 63,4 2,2
Africa and the Middle East 5,2 0,4 18,4 2,4 18,0 2,7 40,1 4,9
Latin and South America 8,4 0,6 34,1 1,5 126,5 4,2 111,0 3,2
Note: We report the nominal value in million NOK due to lack of a proper deflator. Values
equal total equity capital in affiliates abroad multiplied by the ownerships shares of the Norwegian
owners.
The increase in the value of Norwegian FDI has come about both by an increase in the
average value of affiliates and an increase in the number of affiliates. Table 1 provides an
overview of the development in mean and median values for affiliates by geographic region.
For all regions the median FDI project is much smaller than the mean size of FDI projects,
clearly suggesting that the total value of Norwegian FDI in all regions is heavily dominated
by a small number of large investments. This is in line with Gru¨nfeld (2005), who reports
that most of Norwegian FDI in 2001 is undertaken by only five large corporations. Both the
mean and median value of investments increase over time in most regions, but is particularly
noticeable for the fuel exporting developing countries. This can be explained by the size of
investments in the petroleum sector.
Table 2 shows the total number of countries where Norwegian firms have affiliates, along
with the number of investing firms and the number of affiliates. In 1990 Norwegian firms
invested in 89 countries, this increased to 130 countries in 2005. Almost one thousand
Norwegian firms held ownership interests of above 20% in foreign affiliates in 1990, this
8
Table 2: Norwegian FDI: number of countries and investors
1990 1995 2000 2005
Number of countries where Norwegian firms invest 89 102 124 130
Number of Norwegian firms investing abroad 991 753 1 106 1 248
The percentage of firms active in the 8 most important hosts 78 77 78 75
Number of affiliates abroad owned by Norwegian firms 2 947 2 742 4 064 4 962
The percentage of affiliates in the 8 most important hosts 71 68 66 60
Note: The 8 most important hosts are Denmark, Finland, Sweden, France, Germany, Netherlands,
UK and USA.
increased to more than 1200 firms by 2005. The number of affiliates is larger than the
number of investing firms, indicating that a number of firms have more than one affiliate
abroad. Throughout the period, 22% of the firms that establish new foreign affiliates do so
in one country only, and 16% of the firms invest in 2 different countries. The total number
of foreign affiliates held by Norwegian firms increased with about 2000 from 1990 to 2005.
Table 2 also accounts for the percentage of total activity that is concentrated in the top eight
host countries: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and
USA. In 2005, as much as 75% of the firms with investments have affiliates located in at
least one of these eight countries. This share falls to 60% in 2005.
The total number of new foreign affiliates (7365) established from 1991 to 2005 are split by
host region and sector of the investing firm in table 3. Many of these investments are short-
lived, as table 2 showed that the total number of foreign affiliates only increased with 2000
from 1990 to 2005. Overall, manufacturing and financial, business and property services are
the most important sectors with respect to new affiliates established throughout the period.
The number of countries and new investments that we can use in our estimations are
restricted by the availability of control variables for host countries, in particular the proxies
for country level institutional quality. Thus, the final data set for our main analysis consists
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Table 3: New foreign affiliates 1991-2005
Sector of investor
Host region 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Europe 274 1 011 416 415 977 135 3 228
Sweden 44 310 234 97 474 76 1 235
North America 69 234 47 82 213 28 857
Asia and Oceania 54 300 61 162 159 26 762
Fuel exporting countries 70 85 27 40 30 8 260
Transition countries 42 187 100 80 179 16 604
Africa and the Middle East 17 43 14 56 34 10 174
Latin and South America 52 154 20 120 69 14 429
Total 622 2 324 919 1 052 2 135 313 7 365
Sector 1: Primary sector and energy production
Sector 2: Manufacturing
Sector 3: Trade and repairs
Sector 4: Transport,storage and communication
Sector 5: Financial, business and property services
Sector 6: Other
of 2645 new investments established in 93 countries in the years 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003-
2005.11 Table 4 shows the distribution of these investments across sectors.
Table 4: New affiliates used in the regressions
Primary sector and energy production 263
Manufacturing 986
Trade and repairs 257
Transport,storage and communication 423
Financial, business and property services 685
Other 31
Total 2645
11We define a new investment to be the appearance of a new affiliate abroad where a Norwegian firm owns
at least 20% of its shares, and we have information for the investing firm about the industry affiliation and
location in Norway. Investments in affiliates that are already owned by another Norwegian firm, are not
counted. If a Norwegian firm sets up more than one new affiliate in the same country within the same year,
we count this as one new investment.
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3 Empirical approach
The workhorse model in the empirical literature on FDI location decisions is the conditional
logit model.12 In location choice models, the underlying assumption is that a firm chooses
a location for foreign investment that maximizes profits. Thus, there is a set of possible
locations S = (1, .., s, .., n), where location s offers profit pijs(d) to an investor j locating
affiliate d. If the profit from investing in country s is higher than the profit from locating in
country l for a firm j, the firm will choose to invest in country s and the dependent variable
takes the value 1 for the chosen location and zero for all other possible locations.
yjs =

1 if pijs > pijl,
0 otherwise
(1)
As the model assumes that the choice of location is determined by profits, the charac-
teristics that matter for this decision are variables that affect profits. These could include
both attributes of the choice alternatives as well as firm characteristics. We follow Head
et al. (1995) and Blonigen et al. (2005) in assuming that an expression for the profitability
of locating in country s can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function where
agglomeration and information effects, infrastructure elements and variable inputs enter as
arguments. In line with previous studies of location choice, we enter all explanatory variables
with a one-year lag, to reflect the information upon which expectations are formed.
The resulting profitability of country s for investor j may then be represented by the
following function:
pijs = θs +
∑
i∈A
αi lnA
i
js + js, (2)
12Examples includes Head et al. (1995), Hogenbirk and Narula (2004), Gross et al. (2005), Blonigen et al.
(2005), Devereux et al. (2007), Hilber and Voicu (2010), Du et al. (2008) and Arau´jo (2009).
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where θs is a country specific fixed effect, A
i represents agglomeration and information
externalities from source i and js is the error term. Country fixed effects capture a variety
of host country effects that may influence the choice of location. These include factors that
may be unobserved or hard to measure, as well as observable characteristics that are constant
across investors. Thus infrastructure, factor prices, relative factor proportions etc that are
common to all investors into the same host country will also be captured by θs. Equations
(1) and (2) do not have any time subscripts, thus we assume that the country specific factors
that determines the attractiveness of one location over another are constant over time. In
section 5 we discuss how the inclusion of region-year or country-year dummies could loosen
this assumption and how that affects our results.
McFadden (1974) shows that logit choice probabilities can be derived from individual
maximization decisions if unobserved heterogeneity takes the appropriate form. Hence, if
the error term is distributed as a Type 1 extreme value random variable, the probability
of choosing country s among the choice set of L countries is given by the following logit
expression (based on the profit expression in equation 2).
Pr(yjs) =
exp(θs +
∑
i∈A αi lnA
i
js)∑
i∈L exp(θl +
∑
i∈A αi lnA
i
jl)
(3)
The main variables of interest in this model are the Ai variables. In Head et al. (1995)
these are variables assumed to proxy different types of agglomeration forces in region s:
agglomeration of domestic firms proxied by the number of domestic firms in the region,
and agglomeration of previous Japanese investors to the region proxied by the number of
other Japanese firms in the industry or from the same vertical keiretsu of investor j in
the host. In Blonigen et al. (2005), these Ai variables are constructed to capture both
agglomeration forces and networking/information effects. They use the number of previous
investments (stock of investment) by other Japanese firms in the same vertical keiretsu to
capture agglomeration effects, due to the supplier-buyer relationship between firms of the
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same vertical keiretsu. They further argue that the effect of access to information about
the host country, should come mainly from recent investments made by horizontal keiretsu
members, since agglomeration externalities between these firms are unlikely to be important,
as these firms are in unrelated industries.
We use several different variables to proxy for the agglomeration, imitation and inform-
ation sharing effects that may affect (expected) profits and hence the location of new in-
vestments. We use variables counting the presence of other Norwegian investors in the host;
counting both the number of firms from the same industry or the same county in Norway
that have affiliates in the host.13 As in Blonigen et al. (2005) and Arau´jo (2009), we also
split these measures into the stock and flow of Norwegian firms with presence in the host,
see table 5 for precise variable definitions. The finding of a positive coefficient on these vari-
ables for Norwegian presence in the host, means that there is a clustering tendency among
Norwegian firms when investing abroad, and this could be due to any (or a combination)
of the explanations for clustering once we have controlled for the general attractiveness of a
location with the use of country fixed effects.
In order to distinguish the role of information sharing from the two other potential
explanations for clustering, we include interaction terms between our variables for Norwegian
presence and a proxy for the institutional quality of the host. Our argument is one the one
hand that the ‘traditional’ marshallian agglomeration externalities, if present, should not
depend on the institutional quality of the host country. In other words; the presence of
a Norwegian cluster of given size in a host country should have more or less the same
impact on the location decision of new Norwegian investors regardless of the institutional
quality of the host country. A similar argument applies also to the signalling explanation for
clustering. On the other hand, we argue that getting access to information about conditions
in a host country from previous investors is of more value to potential new investors when
13Firms are divided into 42 2-digit nace industries and 21 regions corresponding to the county (fylke)
administrative level.
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the host country has weak institutions. A negative sign on an interaction term between
Norwegian presence in the host and and institutional quality of the host tells us that previous
investment by Norwegian investors is of less importance to new investors in countries with
good institutions, or conversely, of more importance in hosts with weak institutions. Such
an effect would be consistent with information sharing taking place between Norwegian
investors. We also include measures of the firms’ own experience in the host country and
in all other countries. We expect that information gathered within the firm about host
country conditions should play an important role in future location choices of the firm. We
also expect the value of this internal information to be less important for location choice in
countries with better institutional quality.
We use the regulatory quality measure from the Governance indicators to proxy for in-
stitutional quality (World Bank, 2009).14. Regulatory quality reflects perceptions about ‘the
ability of government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that per-
mit and promote private sector development’ (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010, p.6).
Governance is measured in units that follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one in each period. Most scores range between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher
scores indicating better regulatory quality. In order to ease the interpretation of coefficients
on the variables where institutional quality is interacted with Norwegian presence in the host
country, we first use the sign preserving transformation of our proxy for institutional quality
(Busse and Hefeker, 2007): v = ln(x+
√
x2 + 1). We then add 2 to the resulting variable to
ensure all positive values of institutional quality.
As agglomeration, imitation and information sharing effects may not only come from
Norwegian investors, we include a variable for aggregate FDI inflow in our regressions.15
14These measures have been used in a wide range of empirical studies, see e.g. Globerman and Shapiro
(2002), Aggarwal and Goodell (2009) and Kenisarin and Andrews-Speed (2008). The Governance indicators
are available for 180 countries in 1996. The measure has been reported also for 1998, 2000, and annually
from 2002.
15The data is collected from UNCTAD (2009). The real FDI inflow is obtained by using the US GDP
deflator collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm.
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Table 5: Variables for Norwegian presence in host countries
Variable Definition
Total presence The number of other firms with affiliates in the host in t-1:
-industry -from the same 2-digit NACE industry in Norway as the investor.
-county -from the same county of Norway as the investor.
Stock The number of other firms with affiliates in the host in t-2:
-industry -from the same 2-digit NACE industry in Norway as the investor.
-county -from the same county of Norway as the investor.
Flow The number of other firms that establish new affiliates in the host in t-1:
-industry -from the same 2-digit NACE industry in Norway as the investor.
-county -from the same county of Norway as the investor.
Own experience
-in chosen host number of affiliates the investor has in the host in t-1.
-in other countries number of affiliates the investor has in other countries in t-1.
In addition, we include as a control variable a measure of the presence of Swedish FDI in
the host countries. The data on Swedish presence gives information about the number of
Swedish firms by industry that have affiliates in a country and is therefore very similar to
the measurement of our Norwegian presence variable.16 The use of Swedish presence in host
countries as a control variable means that we must exclude Norwegian investments in Sweden
from our analysis. Positive coefficients on the variables for overall FDI and Swedish presence
could be consistent with all three explanations of clustering in FDI, while negative coefficients
on the interaction terms with institutional quality would be consistent with information
sharing. Assuming that there is much less sharing of information from Swedish to Norwegian
firms than between Norwegian firms, we expect the effect of Swedish presence on Norwegian
FDI location to be much smaller than the effect of Norwegian presence. Summary statistics
of our main regression variables are reported in Table 6
16The data on Swedish investments abroad is collected from the web page of the Swedish Agency for
Growth Policy Analysis: http://statistikportalen.tillvaxtanalys.se/. We are not able to split this measure
into stock and flow of Swedish investors.
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Table 6: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Invest (2622 positive outcomes) 0.011 0.105 0 1 236677
Total presence:
-industry 0.446 0.711 0 4.174 236677
-county 0.995 1.068 0 5.094 236677
Stock:
-industry 0.424 0.690 0 4.174 236677
-county 0.962 1.05 0 5.13 236677
Flow:
-industry 0.122 0.346 0 3.045 236677
-county 0.348 0.61 0 3.892 236677
Own experience:
-in host 0.05 0.247 0 5.226 236677
-in other countries 0.176 0.807 0 5.557 236677
Swedish affiliates in host 1.081 1.889 0 8.621 236677
Total FDI flow 7.434 3.144 -9.872 13.35 236677
Regulatory quality 2.288 0.74 0.182 3.474 236677
4 Regression results
In table 7 we report our results from conditional logit estimations of various versions of
equation (3). The first two columns report results where the decision to invest is explained
by the total previous presence of Norwegian firms (measured in t-1), while the remaining
columns split previous presence into stock (measured in t-2) and flow (new investments
during t-1). In columns 1-4 the Norwegian presence variables are calculated as the log of
the number of investors present in the host, after adding 1 to avoid taking the log of zero.17
In column 5 we simply use the number of investors as defined in table 5 as our Norwegian
presence variables.
Overall we see that previous presence of Norwegian firms has a positive effect on the
location decision for new investments. This holds whether we consider total Norwegian
presence in the host country in t-1 (columns 1 and 2), or split total presence into the stock
of Norwegian presence in t-2 and the flow of new investments during t-1 (columns 3-5).
17This is a common approach in the literature, see e.g. Head and Mayer (2004).
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The effect is stronger within industries, while presence in the host by other firms from the
same county of Norway has little effect on location decisions. The probability of choosing a
particular host for new investment increases if the firm has previous experience from the same
host, as can be seen from the variable for own experience in the host. From the positive and
significant coefficient on the variable for the presence of affiliates of Swedish multinationals
in the host country (columns 1 and 3), it could be argued that Norwegian firms tend to
find also the presence of Swedish affiliates in a host as a positive signal for location. The
coefficients on total FDI inflows and regulatory quality are insignificant in table 7.
The results in column 1 and 3 of table 7 do not contain interaction terms, and the
coefficients can therefore be interpreted and compared to the results of previous studies. The
magnitude of the coefficients in columns 1 and 3 can be interpreted as average probability
elasticities (over all choosers and location choices) by multiplying the coefficients with the
ratio S−1
S
where S is the number of choices (Head et al., 1995).18 Thus, our results in column
1 suggests that a 10 % increase in total Norwegian presence of firms within the same industry
increase the likelihood of the average host being chosen as a location for new investments by
close to 5,6 %, while the presence of firms in other industries whose headquarters are located
in the same Norwegian county has no significant effect on location decisions. These results
are quite similar to those found in both Head et al. (1995) and Head and Mayer (2004).19
In column 3 we split total Norwegian presence into the stock of Norwegian firms present
in t-2 and the flow of new investors in t-1. Here the results suggest that a 10 % increase in
either the stock or the flow of same industry investors from Norway increases the likelihood
of an average host being chosen for a new investment by around 3-4 %. These results are
comparable to those of Arau´jo (2009) who finds that a 10% increase in the number of Swedish
18In our case we have 93 possible locations, thus the ratio S−1S is very close to 1.
19Head et al. (1995) find that the presence of other Japanese firms within the same industry in an average
state in the US would increase the likelihood of that state being chosen by a subsequent Japanese investor by
5-6 %. The results in Head and Mayer (2004) indicate that a 10% increase in the presence of other Japanese
firms in a European region would increase the likelihood of a location being chosen for new investments by
approximately 8.5%.
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Table 7: The effect of Norwegian presence on the location of new FDI
1 2 3 4 5
Total presence:
-industry .56 (.04)∗∗ 1.38 (.15)∗∗
-industry∗inst. quality -.29 (.05)∗∗
-county .03 (.05) -.36 (.14)(∗)
-county∗inst. quality .13 (.04)∗
Flow:
-industry .32 (.05)∗∗ .90 (.28)∗ .57 (.12)∗∗
-industry∗inst. quality -.19 (.09)(∗) -.16 (.04)∗∗
-county -.02 (.04) -.38 (.25) -.07 (.09)
-county∗inst. quality .11 (.08) .02 (.03)
Stock:
-industry .37 (.04)∗∗ 1.02 (.17)∗∗ .33 (.05)∗∗
-industry∗inst. quality -.23 (.06)∗∗ -.10 (.02)∗∗
-county .03 (.05) -.28 (.16) -.02 (.02)
-county∗inst. .10 (.05)(∗) .01 (.01)
Own experience:
-in chosen host .80 (.06)∗∗ 4.11 (.30)∗∗ .81 (.06)∗∗ 4.04 (.30)∗∗ .83 (.10)∗∗
-in host∗inst. quality -1.03 (.09)∗∗ -1.00 (.09)∗∗ -.25 (.03)∗∗
-in other countries -.06 (.04) -.14 (.04)∗∗ -.07 (.04) -.15 (.04)∗∗ .01 (.00)∗
Swedish presence .12 (.02)∗∗ .12 (.07) .12 (.02)∗∗ .12 (.07) -.00 (.00)∗
Swedish pres∗inst. quality .00 (.02) .00 (.02) .00 (.00)∗
Total FDI flow to host .01 (.01) -.05 (.04) .01 (.01) -.02 (.04) -.07 (.04)
Total FDI∗inst. quality .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01)
Institutional quality -.16 (.14) -.04 (.18) -.16 (.14) .01 (.18) -.05 (.17)
Observations 236677 236677 236677 236677 236677
Pseudo R2 .22 .23 .22 .23 .21
Log likelihood -9218 -9138 -9227 -9148 -9345
Note: Conditional logit estimates of choice of location for 2645 new Norwegian FDI projects in 93 countries
for the years 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003-2005. Country dummies are included in all regressions. ∗∗,∗ ,(∗)
indicate significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively. Columns 1-4 use log transformations of the counts
of Norwegian presence according to the following formula: v = ln(x + 1). In column 5 the Norwegian
presence variables are the original counts of the number of other investors present in the host. The measure
of institutional quality used is the Regulatory quality index from the Good Governance indicators (World
Bank 2009).
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affiliates established during the previous 2 years increases the the likelihood of location with
1.6 %.20
Our main interest lies in the variables for Norwegian presence and the interaction terms
between previous presence and the institutional quality in host countries. We include these
interaction terms in columns 2, 4 and 5. Our main hypothesis, that getting access to in-
formation from previous investors in a host is of more value to potential investors when they
consider investing in countries with a poor institutional environment, is supported by the
negative interaction terms between institutional quality and previous presence of investors
in the host from the same industry in Norway. The coefficients for the variables on Swedish
presence in the host, and the interaction term with institutional quality are insignificant in
column 4 and very small in column 5. This is consistent with information sharing among
Norwegian investors, but limited information sharing from Swedish investors as well as neg-
ligible signalling effects from Swedish investments.
In our regressions, the interpretation of the coefficients are complicated by the inclusion of
the interaction terms. Hence, the impact of previous Norwegian presence on the localization
of new investments depend in a non-linear way on the regulatory quality of the host.21. In
order to assess the magnitude of our results we therefore calculate the predicted probabilities
from the regressions in column 5 of table 7, and then recalculate the predicted probabilities of
choosing each destination if we add one additional investor to each of the variables capturing
previous same-industry Norwegian presence in the host. We choose the results in column 5
20Blonigen et al. (2005) use a somewhat different method of quantifying their conditional logit results, and
calculate the change in probability for a regression variable as:
(
S−1
S × coefficient× st.dev
) × 100. They
find that a one standard deviation increase in previous-year investment (flow) of firms belonging to the same
horizontal keiretsu would increase the likelihood that a region is chosen for new investment by around 5.3%,
while a standard deviation increase in the stock of investments within the same industry and same vertical
keiretsu imply, respectively, a 23 % and 26 % increase in the probability. Implementing their method on our
results from column 3 in table 7, we find that the effect on the probability of choosing a country for new
investment from a one standard deviation increase in the within-industry flow and stock variables are 10.8
% and 25,2 % respectively.
21See Ai and Norton (2003) for an exposition of how the non-linear nature of logit estimation complicates
the interpretation of coefficients when interaction terms are included
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in this calculation because of the intuitive interpretation of adding one additional investor
when the Norwegian presence variables are measured as count variables. We then assess the
relative change in probability of choosing a host country for different levels of regulatory
quality.22 The results from this exercise are exhibited in table 8 and figure 2.
Table 8: Quantifying the impact of additional Norwegian presence
Quartiles of host country institutional quality: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Average baseline probability of choosing a host country: 0,3 0,5 0,6 3,2
Relative change in probability due to one additional
investor from the same industry in t-1(flow): 27,7 12,4 2,1 -5,2
Relative change in probability due to one additional
investor from the same industry in t-2(stock): 15,5 7,2 1,3 -2,9
Table 8 shows in the first row the average baseline probabilities of locating new FDI to
one of our 93 countries, depending on their institutional quality. The average probability of
locating FDI in a country in the lowest quartile of institutional quality is only 0.3%, while the
average probability of locating investments in countries within the top quartile of regulatory
quality is 3.2%. After adding one additional investor to the variable that captures previous-
year investments in the host by Norwegian firms from the same industry (the flow variable),
the second row of table 8 shows an average increase in the probability of location by 27,7%
for countries in the lowest quartile of regulatory quality. This change in probability following
an extra Norwegian investor falls as regulatory quality increases. For countries in the top
quartile of regulatory quality the average change in probability is small and negative.23 In
the last row of table 8 we add one additional investor to the variable capturing the number of
Norwegian firms present in the host in the year t− 2 (the stock variable). Again, additional
22This approach to quantifying effects of a conditional logit with interaction terms is similar to the exercise,
although in a different setting, conducted by Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008).
23This is due to the nature of conditional logit estimation. The predicted probabilities for the location
choice of a single investment sums to one, hence the sum of changes in probabilities following our experiments
are zero.
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Norwegian presence in a host increase the probability of new location the most for countries
in the lowest quartile of institutional quality.
Figure 2: Quantifying the impact of additional Norwegian presence in host countries
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While table 8 shows that an additional same-industry Norwegian investor in the host on
average lead to a larger relative change in the probability of choosing the host for low levels
of regulatory quality, we plot the the distribution of the relative changes in probability fol-
lowing our two experiments for the groups of host countries within the two lowest quartiles
of regulatory quality in figure 2. The left hand panel shows the distribution following our
first experiment of increasing the flow variable, while the right hand panel shows the distri-
bution following an increase in the stock variable. It is clear from the figure that the whole
distribution of the change in probability for countries in the bottom quartile dominates that
of countries with better regulatory quality. These results are consistent with our hypothesis
that information about a host country (before setting up operations) is more valuable to
potential investors when the institutional environment in the host country is weak. Thus,
increasing the information base (i.e. other Norwegian investors) in hosts with weak insti-
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tutions facilitate further investments in these countries. Our results are also in line with
the findings of Du et al. (2008) who study the link between institutional quality and foreign
agglomerations in different regions of China. They find that regions with better institutions
are more appealing to foreign enterprises, and also that the presence of foreign firms from
the same industry have stronger effects on the localization decision of new FDI in regions
with weaker institutions.24
The larger relative changes in location probabilites following an increase in the number of
recent investors suggests that the information from the recent investors is more important for
location choice than information from firms that have been present in the host for a longer
time. This result is in line with the arguments and findings of Blonigen et al. (2005) who
argue that the information/networking effect from the recent Japanese investors is stronger
than from the Japanese investors having been in a host region for a longer time.
5 Robustness
In the regressions in table 7 we have only included country dummies. We have experimented
with including different time varying host country variables to proxy for possible time vary-
ing attractiveness of host countries. Thus we included real GDP to measure market size,
growth in GDP to measure market potential, trade openness measured by trade as a share of
GDP, and macroeconomic stability proxied by the exchange rate.25 However, these variables
proved insignificant and did not affect our results, we therefore chose to exclude them from
our regressions. We are also concerned that our finding of a clear pattern of clustering of
Norwegian FDI could be driven by certain markets or countries opening up as clear invest-
ment opportunities with a flow of investments over a few years going to these countries.
When markets become attractive for investment, this could be because they are experien-
24Their measure of institutional quality is based upon results from a firm survey (the Chinese Private
Enterprise Survey 1995-2002).
25The data is collected from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006).
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cing economic growth, thus we have added GDP and the interaction between GDP and the
Norwegian presence variables in our regressions, and also done a similar exercise with GDP
growth. These specifications did not alter our results.
An alternative approach to control for omitted variable bias related to macroeconomic
events that might affect the attractiveness of a country as location for FDI is to follow
Blonigen et al. (2005) and include region-year dummies in the regressions. In the appendix
we report how the results from columns 4 (reported in table A2) and 5 (reported in table
A3) of our main regressions in table 7 are affected by including different additional fixed
effects. First, in the second colums of tables A2 and A3 we include region-year dummies
based on dividing the host countries into 10 different geographical regions. Results are very
similar to our baseline regressions reported in the first column of these tables.26
Our conditional logit estimates reported in table 7 are grouped on the identifier of the new
affiliate. This means that both year and industry dummies are constant over the potential
choices of a single chooser (investor). Hence, neither year or industry dummies can be
included. An alternative approach is to group the estimations on the identifier of the investing
firm at home. As at least some investors invest in several countries and at different points in
time, it is then possible to include industry-year dummies. Thus in the last three columns of
tables A2 and A3 we report results of conditional logit estimates grouped on the identifier
of the investing firm, with different fixed effects included. Also these results show the same
picture as previously reported, if anything the impact of Norwegian presence in countries
with low quality institutions seem even stronger when grouping the conditional logit on the
investing firm identifier and including both region-year and industry-year fixed effects. From
the AIC and BIC values shown in these tables, it is not entirely clear which regression should
26We have also tried to include country-year dummies (not reported). This does not change the coefficients
much, but measures of model diagnostics like the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria, the log likelihood
and pseudo R squared all suggest that the simpler model with region-year fixed effects should be preferred.
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be preferred based on these model diagnostics as they are sometimes conflicting. Thus, we
have chosen the simplest version as our main specification in table 7.
A further robustness check we do is to use alternative proxies for institutional quality.
Our preferred measure is the index of regulatory quality, and in table A1 of the appendix
we report results from using different proxies for institutional quality from the World Bank
Governance indicators. These are respectively rule of law, control of corruption, and political
stability. All definitions are from Kaufmann et al. (2010).27 The direction and significance
of our results with respect to the variables for stock and flow of previous investors from the
same industry are not affected by which measure of institutional quality we employ. The
coefficients on the stock of presence by investors from the same county (but not the same
industry) are not significant, while the coefficients on the variables capturing the recent
investors from other industries in the same county are significant in some of the regressions
and with the opposite sign as the variables for recent investors from the same industry. This
may reflect that Norwegian FDI from different industries tend to go to different types of
countries.28
The main concern about the conditional logit model is the assumption of independence
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This implies that the ratio of probabilities of choosing two
locations is independent of the characteristics of a third location. Violating IIA may lead
a model to incorrectly predict the probability of choosing a particular destination while at
the same time underestimate the probability of choosing another location. Hausman and
27The control of corruption index is intended to capture ”perceptions of the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ”capture” of
the state by elites and private interests.” Rule of law is intended to measure ”perceptions on the extent to
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.
The political stability index is intended to capture ”perceptions of the likelihood that the government will
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence
and terrorism”.
28In unreported regressions we have repeated the regressions of table A1 when we group our conditional
logit estimates on the investing firm identifier and include both region-year and industry-year interaction
dummies. These regressions show consistently the same patterns of signs and significance of coefficients as
that of column 1 of table A1.
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McFadden (1984) suggest that IIA can be tested by first estimating the model on the full
set of alternatives and then estimate the model on a subset of alternatives. If IIA holds
then the two sets of estimates should not be statistically different. Head et al. (1995) argue
in addition that unobserved characteristics of the choosers might make some choices closer
substitutes from the perspective of certain choosers such that the IIA assumption is violated.
Therefore the coefficient estimates may not only depend on the sample of choices, but also
on the sample of choosers.
To test the validity of the IIA conditions we therefore exclude subsets of countries and
subsets of investors from our base model (column 5 of table 7) and report the results in
table 9. In the first column 1 we exclude the transition countries of Eastern Europe from
the choice set. Our results are largely unchanged, thus our results do not seem to be driven
by the opening up of Eastern Europe as an investment location during this period. In the
second column we exclude the four countries where the number of investors present in the
host exceed 45 investors in at least one year, these countries are Denmark, the US, UK and
Germany. In columns 3-6 we exclude in each case one of the most important industries
in terms of FDI (at the two digit NACE level). These are NACE 11 (petroleum sector),
NACE 51 (wholesale trade and commission trade), Nace 61 (foreign shipping) and NACE
74 (business services). The last column of table 9 reports the result of our main regression
when we only include investors without previous experience in the host country they choose
to invest in. In this case we do not include the variables for the firms’ own FDI experience.
The Hausman test for equality of the full set of regressors cannot be used when excluding
countries from the choice set as this also changes the number of country fixed effects that
are included in the regressors. Thus, both Head et al. (1995) and Blonigen et al. (2005)
focus on the coefficients of main interest in their respective studies when discussing the IIA
assumption. We follow this approach here. The test that all coefficients, apart from the
country dummies, are equal to those of column 5 in table 7 is rejected for most the columns
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of table 9 (the exception being when excluding the US from the choice set). When testing the
equality of individual coefficients, for most coefficients the null hypothesis that the coefficient
is equal to the corresponding coefficient in column 5 of table 7 cannot be rejected. Looking
across the columns of table 9, signs, magnitude and significance of the estimated coefficients
remain remarkably stable.
As an alternative to excluding certain countries from the choice set of investors, we have
also divided the 89 countries of our sample into 4 groups according to the average of the
four indices of institutional quality from the Good Governance indicators. We have then
estimated the conditional logit within each quartile of countries according to institutional
quality. In this case we have not included the interaction terms between Norwegian presence
and institutional quality. Results from these four conditional logit estimations show the same
pattern as our previous results, and the odds ratios from these regressions are reported in
table 10. Again, it is only the variables for Norwegian presence from the same industry that
have significant effects, while previous investors from the same county do not seem to have
an impact on subsequent Norwegian investments into the host. For the countries with the
lowest institutional quality (column 1) increasing the flow of Norwegian presence with one
investor multiplies the odds of investing in that host by about 2.5, i.e. more than doubles
the odds. For the countries with the best institutional quality (column 4) increasing the flow
of Norwegian presence with one investor hardly changes the odds of investing in that host
with an odds ratio of 1.03. The pattern is similar, but less striking for the stock of previous
investors. As institutional quality improves, the impact from recent investors on location
choice falls. This is consistent with the role of information sharing among investors being
less important for countries with good institutions.
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Table 10: Conditional logit estimates on location of FDI: odds ratios:
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Norwegian presence: Flow
-industry 2.49 (.49)∗∗ 1.19 (.16) 1.16 (.08)(∗) 1.03 (.01)∗
-county .93 (.12) .94 (.09) 1.02 (.05) 1.00 (.00)
Norwegian presence: Stock
-industry 1.24 (.08)∗ 1.12 (.05)∗ 1.11 (.04)∗ 1.02 (.01)∗
-county .96 (.07) .92 (.03)(∗) 1.00 (.02) 1.00 (.00)
Own experience:
-in chosen host 2.48 (.68)∗∗ 2.23 (.30)∗∗ 1.51 (.11)∗∗ 1.03 (.01)∗∗
-in other countries .99 (.01) 1.00 (.00) 1.00 (.00) 1.01 (.00)∗∗
Swedish presence 1.00 (.00) 1.00 (.00) 1.00 (.00) 1.00 (.00)(∗)
Total FDI inflow to host .93 (.03) .89 (.11) 1.06 (.05) 1.01 (.01)
Observations 3796 7619 8864 36678
Pseudo R2 .18 .16 .20 .17
Log likelihood -427 -849 -993 -4440
Number of investments 168 319 401 1757
Number of locations 23 24 24 22
Note: Conditional logit estimates of choice of location for new Norwegian FDI projects
in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003-2005. Odds ratios are reported. Country dummies are
included in all regressions. ∗∗,∗ ,(∗) indicate significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively.
Column 1 (2, 3 and 4) includes investments located in countries within the lowest (second,
3rd and 4th) quartile of institutional quality.
28
6 Conclusions
In this paper our aim has been to assess whether access to information about conditions
in host countries plays a role in the location decisions of Norwegian foreign direct invest-
ment. We argue that getting access to information about a host from other investors with
previous experience is valuable to new investors. Such information may reduce the fixed
costs of FDI or may reduce operating costs once the affiliate in the host has been estab-
lished. We believe that these benefits of information sharing are important in the planning
phase for foreign direct investment, and that they are different from the potential benefit
from ‘Marshallian’ agglomeration externalities once the investment has taken place. The
actual sharing of information among firms can of course not be observed. Our approach to
disentangle information effects form traditional agglomeration externalities is based on the
argument that on the one hand the value of getting access to information about host coun-
try conditions in the planning phase for an investment is greater when an investor considers
investing in a country where the institutional environment is weak, government policies are
not transparent, corruption is regarded as a problem, etc. On the other hand, we believe
that the potential benefit from agglomeration externalities, like access to a pool of labour
or intermediate inputs, should be less dependent on the institutional environment of a host
country.
We estimate conditional logit models of location choice for 2645 new Norwegian FDI
projects in 93 countries in the period 1997-2005, where we include interaction terms between
measures of previous presence of Norwegian firms in the host and proxies for institutional
quality from the World Bank Good Governance indicators. We find that the interaction terms
between previous Norwegian presence from the same industry and institutional quality have
negative and significant coefficients, while previous presence of Norwegian investors from the
same industry have a positive and significant effect on location choice. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis that previous investors to a host country share information
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that affect the FDI decisions of other Norwegian firms in the same industry. This result
is in line with the findings in Blonigen et al. (2005) for Japanese FDI. They argue that
information-sharing may allow a firm to better navigate the tax/regulatory environment of
a foreign country and better site its plant, lowering initial setup costs, as well as operating
costs. This would then make location in the region more likely. What we add, is the finding
that such information-sharing has a larger effect for countries with poor institutions. We
find that the establishment of one additional Norwegian investor in a host country in year t-1
increases the probability of a new investor locating in that country in year t by around 25 %
for countries in the lowest quartile of institutional quality. The effect of previous Norwegian
investors from the same industry falls quickly as institutional quality improves.
From a somewhat different perspective, Harding and Javorcik (2011) find that host coun-
try efforts to attract FDI by using investment promotion agencies (IPAs) are more effective
for host countries where the information asymmetries between the host and potential foreign
investors are large. Their interpretation is that these IPAs reduce transaction costs facing
foreign investors by providing information on business opportunities and helping foreign in-
vestors deal with bureaucratic procedures. Our results complement theirs on the role of
information in promoting FDI. While their analysis focus on the role of information spread
by host country governments, our focus is on information sharing among investors from the
same home country. Taken together, the results would perhaps suggest that IPAs that target
one or a few source countries for FDI would be even more effective as the host governments
efforts to provide information could be supported by information sharing within networks of
source country firms.
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Appendix
Table A1: Robustness: Different measures of institutional quality
1 2 3 4
Flow:
-industry .57 (.12)∗∗ .50 (.11)∗∗ .39 (.10)∗∗ .51 (.11)∗∗
-industry∗inst. quality -.16 (.04)∗∗ -.14 (.03)∗∗ -.10 (.03)∗∗ -.15 (.04)∗∗
-county -.07 (.09) -.19 (.09)∗ -.18 (.07)∗ -.28 (.07)∗∗
-county∗inst. quality .02 (.03) .06 (.03)∗ .05 (.02)∗ .09 (.02)∗∗
Stock:
-industry .33 (.05)∗∗ .38 (.04)∗∗ .37 (.04)∗∗ .22 (.03)∗∗
-industry∗inst. quality -.10 (.02)∗∗ -.11 (.01)∗∗ -.10 (.01)∗∗ -.07 (.01)∗∗
-county -.02 (.02) -.05 (.03) -.04 (.02) .00 (.01)
-county∗inst. quality .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01)(∗) .00 (.00)
Own experience:
-in chosen host .83 (.10)∗∗ 1.34 (.09)∗∗ 1.21 (.08)∗∗ .21 (.07)∗
-in host∗inst. quality -.25 (.03)∗∗ -.40 (.03)∗∗ -.34 (.02)∗∗ -.07 (.03)∗
-in other countries .01 (.00)∗ .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .01 (.00)∗∗
Swedish presence -.00 (.00)∗ -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00)∗∗
Swedish pres∗inst.quality .00 (.00)∗ .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)∗∗
Total FDI flow to host -.07 (.04) -.07 (.04) -.07 (.04) -.10 (.04)∗
Total FDI∗inst. quality .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .04 (.01)∗
Institutional quality -.05 (.17) .22 (.26) .11 (.23) -.11 (.18)
Observations 236677 236677 236677 236677
Pseudo R2 .21 .22 .22 .21
Log likelihood -9345 -9264 -9262 -9359
Note: Column 1 repeats column 5 of table 7. Columns 2-4 uses alternative measures of
institutional quality from the Good Governance indicators (World Bank 2009); respect-
ively rule of law, control of corruption and political stability. ∗∗,∗ ,(∗) indicate significance
at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively.
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Table A2: Robustness to various fixed effects: 1
1 2 3 4 5
Flow:
-industry .90 (.28)∗ .92 (.29)∗ .88 (.28)∗ 1.38 (.28)∗∗ 1.52 (.28)∗∗
-industry∗inst. quality -.19 (.09)(∗) -.21 (.09)(∗) -.19 (.09)(∗) -.36 (.09)∗∗ -.40 (.09)∗∗
-county -.38 (.25) -.19 (.27) -.38 (.25) .29 (.27) .29 (.27)
-county∗inst. quality .11 (.08) .03 (.09) .11 (.08) -.11 (.09) -.12 (.09)
Stock:
-industry 1.02 (.17)∗∗ .94 (.18)∗∗ 1.03 (.17)∗∗ 1.36 (.17)∗∗ 1.22 (.18)∗∗
-industry∗inst. quality -.23 (.06)∗∗ -.19 (.06)∗ -.23 (.06)∗∗ -.27 (.06)∗∗ -.23 (.06)∗∗
-county -.28 (.16) -.51 (.18)∗ -.31 (.16)(∗) .11 (.17) -.13 (.17)
-county∗inst. quality .10 (.05)(∗) .20 (.06)∗∗ .11 (.05)(∗) .12 (.06)(∗) .20 (.06)∗∗
Own experience:
-in chosen host 4.04 (.30)∗∗ 4.17 (.30)∗∗ 4.17 (.31)∗∗ 4.38 (.32)∗∗ 4.54 (.32)∗∗
-in host∗inst. quality -1.00 (.09)∗∗ -1.05 (.09)∗∗ -1.02 (.09)∗∗ -1.09 (.10)∗∗ -1.14 (.10)∗∗
-in other countries -.15 (.04)∗∗ -.15 (.04)∗∗ -.20 (.04)∗∗ -.17 (.04)∗∗ -.17 (.04)∗∗
Swedish presence .12 (.07) .10 (.07) .12 (.07) .20 (.06)∗ .21 (.06)∗
Swedish pres∗inst.quality .00 (.02) .00 (.02) .00 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02)
Total FDI flow to host -.02 (.04) -.05 (.05) -.02 (.04) .02 (.04) .05 (.04)
Total FDI∗inst. quality .01 (.01) .01 (.02) .01 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Institutional quality .01 (.18) -.11 (.21) -.06 (.18) .40 (.10)∗∗ .39 (.10)∗∗
Observations 236677 236677 236677 236677 236677
Pseudo R2 .23 .23 .21 .20 .20
Log likelihood -9148 -9109 -10526 -10613 -10612
AIC 18512 18525 21268 21377 21314
BIC 19632 20112 22388 22155 21781
Grouped by affiliate id Yes Yes
Grouped by investing firm id Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes
Note: Column 1 repeats column 4 of table 7. ∗∗,∗ ,(∗) indicate significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively.
Variables for Norwegian presence are log transformations of the counts of Norwegian presence after adding
1. There are 10 regions and 12 industries used in the interaction dummies.
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Table A3: Robustness to various fixed effects: 2
1 2 3 4 5
Flow:
-industry .57 (.12)∗∗ .57 (.13)∗∗ .56 (.12)∗∗ .81 (.13)∗∗ .85 (.13)∗∗
-industry∗inst. quality -.16 (.04)∗∗ -.17 (.04)∗∗ -.16 (.04)∗∗ -.24 (.04)∗∗ -.25 (.04)∗∗
-county -.07 (.09) -.02 (.09) -.08 (.09) .01 (.11) .06 (.11)
-county∗inst. quality .02 (.03) .01 (.03) .03 (.03) -.01 (.03) -.02 (.03)
Stock:
-industry .33 (.05)∗∗ .26 (.05)∗∗ .33 (.05)∗∗ .53 (.05)∗∗ .47 (.05)∗∗
-industry∗inst. quality -.10 (.02)∗∗ -.08 (.02)∗∗ -.10 (.02)∗∗ -.15 (.02)∗∗ -.13 (.02)∗∗
-county -.02 (.02) -.05 (.03) -.01 (.02) .11 (.03)∗∗ .04 (.03)
-county∗inst. quality .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .00 (.01) -.03 (.01)∗∗ -.01 (.01)
Own experience:
-in chosen host .83 (.10)∗∗ .86 (.10)∗∗ .89 (.10)∗∗ .87 (.11)∗∗ .86 (.11)∗∗
-in host∗inst. quality -.25 (.03)∗∗ -.26 (.03)∗∗ -.27 (.03)∗∗ -.27 (.03)∗∗ -.26 (.03)∗∗
-in other countries .01 (.00)∗ .01 (.00)∗ .00 (.00) .00 (.00)∗∗ .01 (.00)∗∗
Swedish presence -.00 (.00)∗ -.00 (.00)∗ -.00 (.00)∗ -.00 (.00)∗ -.00 (.00)∗
Swedish pres∗inst.quality .00 (.00)∗ .00 (.00)∗ .00 (.00)∗ .00 (.00)∗ .00 (.00)∗
Total FDI flow to host -.07 (.04) -.09 (.05) -.07 (.04) .02 (.04) .06 (.04)
Total FDI∗inst. quality .02 (.01) .03 (.02) .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.01)
Institutional quality -.05 (.17) -.07 (.20) -.06 (.17) .73 (.11)∗∗ .73 (.12)∗∗
Observations 236677 236677 236677 236677 236677
Pseudo R2 .21 .22 .19 .16 .16
Log likelihood -9345 -9311 -10728 -11116 -11120
AIC 18905 18928 21672 22382 22460
BIC 20026 20515 22793 23160 23601
Grouped by affiliate id Yes Yes
Grouped by investing firm id Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes
Note: Column 1 repeats column 5 of table 7. ∗∗,∗ ,(∗) indicate significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively.
Variables for Norwegian presence are log transformations of the counts of Norwegian presence after adding
1. There are 10 regions and 12 industries used in the interaction dummies.
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